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Abstract: In recent years, edge computing has emerged as a new concept in the computing paradigm
that empowers several future technologies, such as 5G, vehicle-to-vehicle communications, and the
Internet of Things (IoT), by providing cloud computing facilities, as well as services to the end
users. However, open communication among the entities in an edge based IoT environment makes it
vulnerable to various potential attacks that are executed by an adversary. Device authentication is
one of the prominent techniques in security that permits an IoT device to authenticate mutually with
a cloud server with the help of an edge node. If authentication is successful, they establish a session
key between them for secure communication. To achieve this goal, a novel device authentication
and key management mechanism for the edge based IoT environment, called the lightweight
authentication and key management scheme for the edge based IoT environment (LDAKM-EIoT),
was designed. The detailed security analysis and formal security verification conducted by the
widely used “Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)” tool
prove that the proposed LDAKM-EIoT is secure against several attack vectors that exist in the
infrastructure of the edge based IoT environment. The elaborated comparative analysis of the
proposed LDAKM-EIoT and different closely related schemes provides evidence that LDAKM-EIoT
is more secure with less communication and computation costs. Finally, the network performance
parameters are calculated and analyzed using the NS2 simulation to demonstrate the practical facets
of the proposed LDAKM-EIoT.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT); edge computing; authentication; key management; security;
AVISPA; NS2 simulation
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of physical objects (for example, smart devices) such as
smart vehicles, smart industrial monitoring machines, smart home appliances, and many more. Such
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objects are connected together to gather, process, rectify, and exchange relevant data over the Internet [1–6].
Furthermore, smart devices along with application programming interfaces (APIs) are used to connect and
exchange data over the Internet. Each physical object (i.e., smart lighting system) has a provided IP address,
which makes it capable to communicate (i.e., sending and receiving) over the network without human
involvement. The shortage of IPv4 addresses resulted in designing the “IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN)”, which has significantly changed the IoT in order to increase the
use of IPv6 by smart, as well as small scale objects [7]. The IoT communication environment is used in
various types of applications, such as “smart health care”, “smart traffic monitoring”, and “smart homes”,
to name a few. Edge computing introduced a new concept of computing. It has already become popular in
industry, as well as academic research communities. It empowers many future technologies (for example,
5G, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-cloud communications, augmented reality) by putting the connection
in between end users and the cloud computing model and services [8–10]. Edge computing brings the
utilities and services of cloud computing, which results in the faster processing and quicker response time
of applications. Edge computing facilities the produced data of smart devices in the IoT environment to be
processed nearby the location where it was generated in place of sending it across long routes to the “cloud”
or “data centers” [10–12]. Though the edge based IoT environment provides many advantages over the
traditional computing environment, at the same time, it has also the following security and privacy issues:
• The exchanged messages among different communicating parties (i.e., “IoT device”, “edge node”,
and “cloud server”) should be protected against several known attacks (for example, “replay”,
“man-in-the-middle”, “impersonation”, “offline or online password guessing”, and some other
kinds of “bypassing attacks”).
• The edge node receives and processes the data, which are sent by the IoT devices. After the
required processing, the edge node sends the data to the cloud server(s) for further processing
and storage. Sometimes, the sent data are very critical and important, and any kind of disclosure
of the data creates big trouble. Therefore, we need strong secure privacy preservation techniques
to protect the data in the edge based IoT environment.
• As existing authentication protocols have security flaws that make them vulnerable to some
known attacks (for example, “privileged insider attack”, “online and offline password guessing”,
etc.), consequently, it becomes important to enhance the security of the authentication protocols,
for instance in the case of “new device addition or revocation”, other communicating parties of
the network should also be informed by the concerned (trusted) authority so that they can become
aware about this activity and can update their memories accordingly [1,4]. Hence, it is an exigent
task to provide a design for such a kind of protocol that supports “dynamic installation/update”
without compromising the security of the system [4].
• In the edge based IoT environment, there is a possibility that some IoT devices may be “physically
stolen/captured” by the adversary (A). After the physical capturing,A can use a “power analysis
attack” [13] to obtain the data from the memory of the captured smart IoT devices. Later on,
this drawn out information is used for other malicious works, such as deriving the “session key”
among an IoT device and cloud server. A can replace the physical captured device with his/her
own malicious device(s) that he/she has cloned in the laboratory. We should be more careful
while going for the design of authentication and key management techniques in case some IoT
devices are physically compromised so that there should not be any affect on the security of
communication happening in the rest of the network [1,4].
As discussed earlier, the edge based IoT environment has several issues related to security and
privacy. The existing authentication schemes have various “security flaws” that make them vulnerable
to different known and unknown attacks. Some of them are not efficient from the computation and
communication cost point of few. Hence, there is an essential requirement for a new “lightweight
authentication and key management” scheme for the edge based IoT environment. Consequently,
we design a new “lightweight authentication and key management” scheme for such an environment.
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1.1. Contributions of LDAKM-EIoT
The contributions of this paper are many-fold in the following contexts:
• We propose a new “lightweight authentication and key management” scheme for edge based
IoT environment (LDAKM-EIoT). In LDAKM-EIoT, we use various efficient operations such as
bitwise “exclusive-OR (XOR)” and “one way collision resistant cryptographic hash functions”.
• LDAKM-EIoT is secure against different kinds of attacks by the help of “formal security verification”
using the widely used AVISPA tool and also through other mathematical security analysis.
• The detailed comparative investigation among related existing schemes and LDAKM-EIoT
evidences that LDAKM-EIoT achieves more security and additional functionality features and
LDAKM-EIoT has also less communication and computation costs as compared to the other
related schemes.
• The practical simulation study of LDAKM-EIoT is also executed with the help of the broadly used
NS2 tool.
1.2. Paper Structure
The information about the “network model” and “threat model” of LDAKM-EIoT is discussed in
Section 2. The brief discussion on the related existing authentication techniques is provided in Section 3.
Different phases of LDAKM-EIoT are explained in Section 4. The security analysis of LDAKM-EIoT is
conducted in Section 5. The formal security verification by the help of the AVISPA tool is done and
explained in Section 6. The performance comparison among LDAKM-EIoT and other related existing
authentication techniques is explained in Section 7. The impact of LDAKM-EIoT and other related
schemes on network performance parameters is measured, analyzed, and then compared in Section 8
using the NS2 simulation. At last, the paper is concluded in Section 9.
2. Related Work
Wolf and Serpanos [14] explained different security issues of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and
IoT systems. They discussed a security (safety) threat model for CPS and IoT systems. Ni et al. [15]
explained the role of fog nodes in various IoT applications. After that, they examined several promising
IoT applications as per these different roles.
Yeh et al. [16] demonstrated an “elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)” based user authentication
mechanism for wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Their scheme did not achieve the mutual authentication
property. To fix the problem of their scheme, Shi and Gong [17] proposed another improved “ECC based
user authentication” scheme in WSNs. After that, Turkanovic et al. [18] came up with another user
“authentication and key establishment” protocol for heterogeneous WSNs. Later on, their scheme was
discovered to be insecure against “offline password guessing”, “offline identity guessing”, “smart card
stolen”, “sensor node impersonation”, and “user impersonation” attacks. Moreover, their scheme did
not support one of the essential properties, named as “mutual authentication” [19].
Khalil et al. [20] shed some light on the integration of WSNs in IoT. In the IoT environment,
smart devices have limited computing and storage resources, like WSNs. It is also emphasized that
some of the existing authentication techniques had serious security flaws as they were vulnerable to
“impersonation”, “sensing node physical capture”, “replay”, “man-in-the-middle”, and “privileged
insider” attacks [3,21].
Farash et al. [21] demonstrated a technique for “user authentication and key establishment” for
heterogeneous WSNs, which can be applicable for IoT communication. Later on, Amin et al. [22]
did cryptanalysis on the scheme of Farash et al. [21] and discovered that it was not secure
against possible attacks such as “offline password guessing” by using the lost/stolen smart card,
“session-specific temporary information leakage”, and “user impersonation” attacks. Furthermore,
Amin et al. [22] proposed an improved version of their scheme to mitigate the security flaws of
Farash et al.’s scheme [21]. Srinivas et al. [23] demonstrated that the scheme of Amin et al. [22] was
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insecure against “user impersonation”, “leakage of different keys”, “stolen smart card”, and “server
spoofing” attacks. Srinivas et al. further presented an improved and enhanced version of their scheme
for “user authentication” in multi-gateway WSNs applicable to the IoT environment. Jiang et al. [24]
also discovered the security flaws in the scheme of Amin et al. [22] as it was not able to mitigate
some attacks. To overcome these vulnerabilities in the scheme of Amin et al., Jiang et al. presented
an improved scheme.
Hsieh and Leu [25] proposed a new technique to resolve the security weaknesses of the other
schemes [26–28]. Later on, Wu et al. [29] performed crypto-analysis of Hsieh–Leu’s scheme and
identified the vulnerabilities of their scheme as it was not secure against different attacks such as
“offline guessing”, “user forgery”, “insider attack”, and “sensor node physical capturing”. In addition,
their scheme was not secure against the session key security, and also, it did not provide the mutual
authentication property. To resolve these problems, Wu et al. presented a new “user authentication”
protocol for WSN, which was also applicable to IoT communication.
Li et al. [30] presented a device-to-device authentication protocol in the IoT environment.
Their approach relied on public key techniques that needed public key encryption and decryption by
the resource limited IoT smart devices. Though their approach maintained security, it demanded high
communication and computation overheads from the IoT devices’ point of view.
Santos et al. [31] designed a “federated identity management (FIdM)” system in order to assist in
improving privacy and user authentication in the IoT deployment, where an IoT device accesses services
from a service provider. Their approach was lightweight as it required low computational cost due to
symmetric cryptographic operations. They applied their proposal to a cashless toll system environment.
Gope and Sikdar [32] designed a “lightweight and privacy preserving two factor authentication”
scheme in which physical security was included. In their proposal, an IoT device and a server mutually
authenticated each other for accessing services in the IoT environment. However, their scheme needed
more computational cost due to fuzzy extractor generation and reproduction functions [33].
In order to design an access control and security policy, Han and Kim [34] designed a mutual
authentication scheme between IoT devices. Though their scheme was lightweight due to symmetric
cryptographic operations, it did not preserve device anonymity and untraceability properties.
Group key management (GKM) is considered as another important security aspect in the IoT
environment, which helps with assigning IoT devices into predefined groups in the network. After that,
key management is essential within each group and also among various groups in order to improve
efficiency and security in the IoT environment. For this issue, Kung and Hsiao [35] designed an efficient
GKM policy in an IoT deployment. Their approach also permitted joining and leaving the devices
in a group dynamically in the IoT environment. Their approach was lightweight as it relied on the
“cryptographic hash function” and symmetric cryptographic operations.
Raza and Magnusson [36] pointed out that “unanimous consensus” is extremely essential in the
IoT environment for cyber security purposes. They presented a lightweight adaptation of the “Internet
Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)” for the IoT deployment, called TinyIKE. With the help of TinyIKE,
they were able to solve the key management issue for several IoT protocols by applying a single IKEv2
based approach. TinyIKE relies on certificates, elliptic curve cryptographic techniques, as well as
symmetric cryptographic techniques.
Challa et al. [3] recommended an ECC based user authentication protocol for IoT applications that
can be used in the coming future. However, Jia et al. [37] highlighted that Challa et al.’s method did not
protect against impersonation attack and also it did not preserve the untraceability property. Moreover,
Challa et al.’s scheme [3] was expensive in computation and communication. Recently, Malani et al. [38]
presented a “certificate based device access control” scheme applied to IoT communication to mitigate
the security problems and limitations of the existing authentication and access control protocols.
Their scheme the preserved anonymity property.
Sharma and Kalra [39] proposed a lightweight user authentication protocol that can be applied to
healthcare services in the cloud-IoT environment. However, their scheme was insecure against
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privileged-insider attack during the registration of medical professional, where the password of the
medical professional was easily guessed by an attacker with the help of stolen smart card attack
and registered information supplied by the medical professional to the gateway node. Moreover,
their scheme did not provide the sensor node anonymity property and session key security under
the Canetti and Krawczyk (CK) adversary model [40] (discussed in the threat model in Section 3.2).
Zhou et al. [41] designed an authentication protocol that utilized IoT based architectures combined
with cloud servers. Though their scheme was lightweight in nature, Martinez-Pelaez et al. [42] pointed
out that Zhou et al.’s scheme [41] was vulnerable to various attacks, such as privileged-insider attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, and user impersonation attack. Furthermore, Martinez-Pelaez
et al. also showed that Zhou et al.’s scheme failed to provide mutual authentication and secret key
protection. To mitigate the security limitations mentioned in Zhou et al.’s scheme, Martinez-Pelaez et al.
proposed an efficient authentication scheme.
As discussed above, most of the available methods for “authentication and key agreement” for
communication in IoT and WSNs are insecure against different types of attacks. In addition, some of
these techniques use heavy weight operations as they require more communication and computing
resources. As a result, these existing techniques demonstrated for the “IoT environment” may not be
much suitable for the authentication procedure in the edge based IoT environment. Consequently,
we perceive that there is a requirement for a secure “authentication and key management” mechanism
for the edge based IoT environment that should be lightweight. To fulfill this goal, we propose a new
“lightweight authentication and key management” scheme for the edge based IoT environment that
utilizes only an efficient “one way cryptographic hash” function and “bitwise XOR” operation.
3. System Models
The following two models are utilized to describe the working and usability of LDAKM-EIoT.
3.1. Network Model
The network model of LDAKM-EIoT is presented in Figure 1. In this figure, we have IoT devices,
an edge node, which is a gateway to the Internet, the cloud server(s), and a trusted authority (TA). IoT
devices can be deployed as per their applications (for example, smart health care, smart manufacturing,
smart cities, and smart homes). The task of each IoT device is to collect and process information
about some activity (i.e., level of fumes in a industrial plant) and then to send the data to the cloud
server(s) through the edge node. At the cloud server, this will be stored and utilized for other
processing and decision making tasks. In this model, IoT devices are resource constrained, whereas
the edge node and cloud server are resource rich as they are able to do intensive computations
and have more storage capacity and battery backup. The TA is responsible for the registration of
different devices (i.e., IoT devices, edge nodes, and cloud servers). In such a kind of communication
environment, we have to secure the communication between the IoT device and edge node and the
edge node and cloud server. Since most of IoT devices are resource constrained, we preferred to use
lightweight cryptographic operations (i.e., hash and XOR operations) in different exchanged messages’
computation. Consequently, to secure such kinds of communication, we urge a new “authentication
and key management” protocol with lightweight operations. Using this scheme, the communicating
entities can securely access the resources of other entities and also communicate securely.
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Figure 1. Network model of the edge based IoT environment.
3.2. Threat Model
The widely accepted “Dolev–Yao (DY) threat model” [43] was followed in the designing of
LDAKM-EIoT. As per the guidelines of the DY model, two communicating entities communicate over
an open (insecure) channel. The end-point entities such as “IoT devices” are not fully trusted in general.
The existing network adversary (A) can eavesdrop, update, or delete the communicated messages as
the channel is insecure. We also followed Canetti and Krawczyk’s adversary model, also named as
the “CK adversary model” [40], which is the current de facto standard model in the designing and
modeling of an “authenticated key agreement” security scheme. In the CK adversary model, A can
have all the capabilities like the DY model. In addition to that, A can also compromise the secret
credentials along with the “session states and session keys” during a session. Moreover,A can physical
capture some IoT devices and extract the stored information from the IoT devices by the application of
a sophisticated power analysis attack [13]. The obtained credentials can be further used to perform
other kinds of malicious activities, such as the computation of “secret credentials” and the “session
key”, and launch some attacks, such as “IoT device impersonation”, “replay”, “privileged-insider”,
and “man-in-the-middle”. As per the information available in [44], we also assumed that the edge node
(EN) was fully trusted and could not be compromised by A. Otherwise, if the EN was compromised,
the entire network would be compromised. For such a purpose, we followed the method discussed by
Bertino et al.’s protocol [45]. We assumed that the EN was equipped with a tamper resistant hardware
device so that all the sensitive confidential information (for example, stored cryptographic keys) should
be protected from A. Therefore, the application of a tamper resistant EN attained strong enough
security in LDAKM-EIoT. Though it is also true that the attacks are possible on tamper resistant devices,
A needs special equipment (device) to perform such an attack to acquire the stored information. This is
because it is less expensive to install the EN than to use special equipment because A does not have
any economic benefits to perform such an attack on a security scheme [45]. Moreover, we could secure
the EN by putting it inside a physical locking system so that the physical capture of the EN will be
difficult for A as compared to that for the unattended IoT smart devices. In addition, the “trusted
authority (TA)” was also assumed to be a “fully trusted” entity of the network and that it would not
be compromised, although the “cloud servers” were considered to be “semi-trusted” entities.
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4. The Proposed Scheme: LDAKM-EIoT
In this section, we talk about the precise workings of the proposed scheme, called the “lightweight
authenticated key management mechanism for the edge-based IoT environment (LDAKM-EIoT)”.
The distinct phases of LDAKM-EIoT are provided in the upcoming part of the paper. It was
also assumed that the different network entities (i.e., IoT device, edge node, cloud server) were
synchronized with their clocks. It is mandatory to have this assumption while we go for the designing
of an authentication mechanism for different networks [1–3,46–48]. We needed different notations for
the designing of LDAKM-EIoT, which we summarize in Table 1 along with their significance.
Table 1. Notations used in the lightweight authenticated key management mechanism for the
edge-based IoT environment (LDAKM-EIoT).
Symbol Meaning
Di, IDDi ith IoT device and its identity, respectively
CSj, IDCSj jth cloud server and its identity, respectively
EN, IDEN Edge node and its identity, respectively
TA, IDTA Trusted authority and its identity, respectively
RIDDi , RIDCSj Pseudo identities of Di and CSj, respectively
TIDDi Temporary identity of Di
KEN−Di 1024 bit shared secret key of the IoT device and edge node generated by TA
KEN−CSi 1024 bit shared secret key of the edge node and cloud server generated by TA
n 160 bit secret secret of TA, which is only known to TA.
RTSDi Registration timestamp of Di
nd, nc Number of IoT devices and cloud servers deployed initially, respectively
rdi , ren1 , ren2 , rcsj 128 bit random numbers of Di, EN, and CSj, respectively
T1, T2, T3, T4 Current timestamps generated by different entities
∆ T “Maximum transmission delay” associated with a message
h(·) “Collision resistant cryptographic one way hash function”
SKDi−CSj Session key between Di and CSj
||, ⊕ Concatenation and bitwise XOR operations, respectively
4.1. Pre-Deployment Phase
This phase permitted the trusted authority (TA), a fully trusted entity in the network, to perform
the registration of IoT devices, edge nodes, and cloud servers before they were installed in the
deployment area. We assumed that nd number of IoT devices Di were associated with a particular
edge node EN, and the real-time information could be accessed from the IoT devices to nc number of
cloud servers CSj, provided that a mutual authentication and key establishment happened successfully
among the IoT devices and cloud servers with the presence of the edge node EN.
4.1.1. Registration of IoT Devices
The TA firsts picked a distinct unique identity IDDi for every IoT device Di and computed
its corresponding pseudo identity as RIDDi = h(n||IDDi ), temporal credentials TCDi = h(RIDDi
||IDEN ||IDTA ||n ||RTSDi ), ADi = h(KEN−Di || IDDi ||IDEN || RTSDi ) where RTSDi is the registration
timestamp for Di, KEN−Di is a 1024 bit shared secret key between each IoT device Di and edge nodes
generated by the TA, where i = 1, 2, · · · nd, and nd is the total count of IoT devices. Moreover, IDEN
is the identity of an edge node EN where the IoT devices need to authenticate a cloud server CSj
with an IoT device Di. IDTA is the identity of TA, and n is a 160 bit secret number of TA that is only
disclosed to the TA. After that, TA generates a temporary identity TIDDi for each Di. Note that
temporal credentials are different for each IoT device Di, which protects against various attacks
including impersonation attack, in case any IoT device is physically compromised by an attacker.
Lastly, the trusted authority stores the credentials {RIDDi , TIDDi , TCDi , ADi, h(·)} in the memory of
Di prior to its placement in the IoT network.
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4.1.2. Registration of Cloud Servers
The TA picks a distinct unique identity IDCSj for each cloud server CSj and proceeds to calculate
its pseudo identity as RIDCSj = h(n ||IDCSj) and ACSj = h(KEN−CSj ||IDCSj ||IDEN ||RTSCSj) where
RTSCSj is the registration timestamp for CSj and j = 1, 2, · · · nc, nc are the number of cloud servers
placed initially in the IoT network, while KEN−CSj is a 1024 bit shared secret key of the edge node and
cloud server CSj generated by the TA. Next, the TA stores the credentials {RIDCSj , ACSj, IDCSj , h(·)}
in the database of CSj before its placement in the network.
4.1.3. Registration of Edge Node
The TA picks a distinct unique identity IDEN for edge node EN and stores previously computed
information, as well as this information, that is 〈{(TIDDi , RIDDi , IDDi , TCDi , ADi) |1 ≤ i ≤ nd},
{(IDCSj , RIDCSj , ACSj)|1 ≤ j ≤ nc}, h(·)〉, in the database of EN before its placement in the network.
The registration process is summarized in Figure 2.
IoT device (Di)
{RIDDi , TIDDi , TCDi , ADi, h(·)}
Cloud server (CSj)
{RIDCSj , ACSj, IDCSj , h(·)}
Edge node (EN)
〈{(TIDDi , RIDDi , IDDi , TCDi , ADi) |1 ≤ i ≤ nd},
{(IDCSj , RIDCSj , ACSj) |1 ≤ j ≤ nc}, h(·)〉
Figure 2. Credentials stored in Di, CSj, and EN during registration processes.
4.2. Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
The key management procedure helps to secure the authentication and key management among
IoT devices and cloud servers by the involvement of a trusted edge node. The upcoming steps are
essential to achieve this goal.
A1. When an IoT device, say Di, wants to initiate secure data transmission to a cloud server, first
of all, Di needs to compute the following parameters. Di picks a random nonce rdi and current
timestamp T1 and calculates M1 = h(ADi||T1) ⊕rdi and M2 = h(ADi|| T1|| TIDDi ||RIDDi ||
TCDi ||rdi ). Next, Di sends the message Msg1 = {TIDDi , M1, M2, T1} to the edge node EN
via an open channel.
A2. After the arrival of message Msg1 at time T∗1 , the EN checks the timeliness of T1 with the
verifying condition |T1 − T∗1 | ≤ ∆ T. If it is valid, the EN fetches RIDDi , TCDi , ADi, and IDDi
corresponding to received TIDDi and computes rdi = M1⊕ h(ADi||T1), M
′
2 = h(ADi ||T1||
TIDDi || RIDDi || TCDi || rdi ) and checks whether M
′
2 = M2. If it is valid, Di is authenticated by
the EN and can access its resources to get access to a cloud server CSj selected by the EN. Next,
the EN chooses a random nonce ren1 and current timestamp T2, picks ACSj from its database
corresponding to IDCSj , and computes TID
′
Di
= TIDDi⊕ h(ACSj||T2), M3 = h(ACSj||RIDCSj)
⊕h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) and M4 = h(TIDDi ||T2 ||RIDCSj ||ACSj ||h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi
||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi )). After that, the EN sends the message Msg2 = {TID
′
Di
, M3, M4, T2} to CSj
via an open channel.
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A3. After the arrival of message Msg2 at time T∗2 , CSj verifies the timeliness of T2 by checking if
|T2 − T∗2 | ≤ ∆ T is valid. After successful verification of T2, CSj computes TIDDi = TID′Di⊕
h(ACSj ||T2), h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) = M3⊕ h(ACSj|| RIDCSj) and M
′
4 = h(TIDDi
||T2 ||RIDCSj ||ACSj ||h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi )). After that, CSj checks whether
M′4 = M4 is satisfied. If it is valid, the EN is authenticated by CSj. Otherwise, CSj halts
the session with the EN immediately. Furthermore, CSj picks up a random nonce rcsj and
current timestamp T3 and computes M5 = rcsj⊕ h(T2|| ACSj|| RIDCSj). Then, CSj computes the
session key shared with Di as SKCSj−Di = h(TIDDi || T3|| h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi )
||h(rCSj ||ACSj ||IDCSj ||T3)), M6 = h(SKCSj−Di ||T3), and M7 = h(rcsj ||T2 ||T3 ||ACSj ||RIDCSj).
After computing these values, CSj sends the message Msg3 = {M5, M6, M7, T3} to the EN
via an open channel.
A4. After arrival of message Msg3 at time T∗3 , the EN verifies the timeliness of T3 by checking if
|T3 − T∗3 | ≤ ∆ T is valid. Upon successful validation of T3, the EN calculates rcsj = M5⊕ h(T2
||ACSj ||RIDCSj) and M
′
7 = h(rcsj || T2|| T3|| ACSj|| RIDCSj). Next, the EN checks whether
M′7 = M7, and if it holds, CSj is authenticated by the EN. Otherwise, the EN halts the session
with CSj instantly. Furthermore, the EN selects a random nonce ren2 along with current timestamp
T4 and computes M8 = h(ADi||TCDi )⊕h(ren2 ||T4), α = h(RIDDi ||TCDi ||T4)⊕h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi
||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ), β = h(rCSj || ACSj|| IDCSj ||T3) ⊕h(h(ren2 ||T4)) ||ADi||TCDi ) and M9 =
h(M6|| M8|| h(ren2 ||T4) ||T3 ||T4). After computing these values, the EN picks a new temporary




The EN also replaces TIDDi with TID
new
Di
in its database. Finally, the EN sends the message
Msg4 = {M8, α, β, M9, M10, T3, T4} to EN via an open channel.
A5. After arrival of message Msg4 at time T∗4 , Di verifies the timeliness of T4 by checking if |T4 − T∗4 |
≤ ∆ T is valid. After successful validation of T4, Di calculates h(ren2 ||T4) = M8⊕ h(ADi||TCDi ),
h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) = α ⊕ h(RIDDi ||TCDi ||T4), h(rCSj || ACSj|| IDCSj ||T3) =
β ⊕ h(h(ren2 ||T4)) ||ADi||TCDi ), the shared session key with CSj as SKDi−CSj = h(TIDDi || T3||
h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) ||h(rCSj ||ACSj ||IDCSj ||T3)). In addition, Di also calculates




6|| M8|| h(ren2 ||T4) ||T3 ||T4). Then, Di checks whether
M′9 = M9, and if it is legitimate, the EN, as well as CSj are authenticated by Di, and the computed
session key is treated as the valid one. Thus, both Di and CSj will maintain the same computed
shared session key SKDi−CSj (= SKCSj−Di ) for secret communications. Moreover, Di calculates
the new temporary identity as TIDnewDi = M10⊕ h(M9 ||T3 ||T4 ||ADi ||TCDi ||TIDDi ) and will
use this new identity in all its future communications with the EN and CSj. It is worth noticing
that the new temporary identity generation mechanism makes the proposed scheme prevent the
traceability attack.
Finally, the above phase is abridged in Figure 3.
Remark 1 (Protection for synchronization attack). We may consider a situation where the message Msg4
has been tampered with or there is a communication error that occurs so that an IoT device cannot receive the
parameter M10, as well as the new temporary identity TIDnewDi . In order to resolve this problem, we contemplated
a possible solution suggested in [49], where an IoT device needs to maintain a set of l shadow identities SID =
{sid1, sid2, · · · , sidl}. In this context, when an IoT device, say Di, could not receive the message Msg4 within
a specific time period (maximum round-trip time), it needs to select one of the unused shadow identities,
say sidj ∈ SID, and then send it within the message Msg1. When the EN receives the sidj, it can generate a new
TIDand send it securely to the device Di. By using this method, we can address the synchronization attacks
without compromising the privacy of an IoT device in the proposed scheme (LDAKM-EIoT).
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IoT device (Di) Edge node (EN) Cloud server (CSj)
Choose rdi and T1.
Calculate M1 = h(ADi||T1) ⊕rdi ,
M2 = h(ADi|| T1|| TIDDi
||RIDDi || TCDi ||rdi ).
Msg1 = {TIDDi , M1, M2, T1}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(via public channel)
Check if |T1 − T∗1 | ≤ ∆ T? If so,
fetch RIDDi , TCDi , ADi and IDDi
from its database.
Compute rdi = M1⊕ h(ADi||T1),
M′2 = h(ADi ||T1|| TIDDi ||
RIDDi || TCDi || rdi ).
Check if M′2 = M2? If so,
choose ren1 and T2.
Pick ACSj corresponding to IDCSj . Check if |T2 − T∗2 | ≤ ∆ T? If so,
Compute TID′Di = TIDDi⊕ h(ACSj||T2), Compute TIDDi = TID
′
Di⊕ h(ACSj ||T2),
M3 = h(ACSj||RIDCSj ) ⊕h(ren1 ||T1 h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi
||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ), ||TCDi ) = M3⊕ h(ACSj|| RIDCSj ),
M4 = h(TIDDi ||T2 ||RIDCSj ||ACSj M′4 = h(TIDDi ||T2 ||RIDCSj ||ACSj
||h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi )). ||h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi )).
Msg2 = {TID′Di , M3, M4, T2}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify if M′4 = M4? If so,
(via public channel) choose rcsj and T3.
Compute M5 = rcsj⊕ h(T2|| ACSj|| RIDCSj ),
SKCSj−Di = h(TIDDi || T3|| h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi||
IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) ||h(rCSj ||ACSj ||IDCSj ||T3)),
Check if |T3 − T∗3 | ≤ ∆ T? If so, M6 = h(SKCSj−Di ||T3),
compute rcsj = M5⊕ h(T2 ||ACSj ||RIDCSj ), M7 = h(rcsj ||T2 ||T3 ||ACSj ||RIDCSj ).
M′7 = h(rcsj || T2|| T3|| ACSj|| RIDCSj ). Msg3 = {M5, M6, M7, T3}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify if M′7 = M7? If so, (via public channel)
choose ren2 and T4.
Compute M8 = h(ADi||TCDi ) ⊕h(ren2 ||T4),
α = h(RIDDi ||TCDi ||T4) ⊕h(ren1 ||T1
||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ),
Check if |T4 − T∗4 | ≤ ∆ T? If so, β = h(rCSj || ACSj|| IDCSj ||T3)
compute h(ren2 ||T4) = M8⊕ h(ADi||TCDi ), ⊕h(h(ren2 ||T4)) ||ADi||TCDi ),
h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi M9 = h(M6|| M8|| h(ren2 ||T4) ||T3 ||T4).
||TCDi ) = α ⊕ h(RIDDi ||TCDi ||T4), Pick new TIDnewDi .
h(rCSj || ACSj|| IDCSj ||T3) = Compute M10 = h(M9 ||T3 ||T4 ||ADi
β ⊕ h(h(ren2 ||T4)) ||ADi||TCDi ), ||TCDi ||TIDDi ) ⊕TIDnewDi .
CSj as SKDi−CSj = h(TIDDi || T3|| Replace TIDDi with TIDnewDi .
h(ren1 ||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi Msg4 = {M8, α, β, M9, M10, T3, T4}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
||TCDi ) ||h(rCSj ||ACSj ||IDCSj ||T3)), (via public channel)
M′6 = h(SKDi−CSj ||T3),
M′9 = h(M
′
6|| M8|| h(ren2 ||T4) ||T3 ||T4).
Check if M′9 = M9? If so,
compute TIDnewDi = M10⊕ h(M9 ||T3
||T4 ||ADi ||TCDi ||TIDDi ).
Replace TIDDi with TID
new
Di .
Both Di and CSj store the shared common session key SKDi−CSj = (SKCSj−Di ).
Figure 3. Abridging of the authentication and key agreement phase.
4.3. Dynamic Node Addition Phase
There is the chance that some of the IoT devices fail to work properly or might stop their working
completely. Furthermore, there is the possibility that some of the IoT devices can be “physically
stolen (capture)” by an adversary A. In order to draw out the useful data from the stolen IoT devices
(i.e., session key, temporary and pseudo identities, and other credentials stored in their memory),
henceforth, it becomes very important to add new IoT devices in the required area. LDAKM-EIoT
provides a facility for the addition of new IoT devices and also cloud servers in the network at any
time after initial installment.
4.3.1. Dynamic IoT Device Addition
The upcoming procedure is needed to add a new IoT device, say Dni, in the required part of the
IoT environment.
DD1. The TA picks a new unique identity IDDni for the new IoT device Dni and computes its
corresponding pseudo identity as RIDDni = h(n ||IDDni ), temporal credentials TCDni = h(RIDDni
||IDEN ||IDTA ||n ||RTSDni ), ADni = h(KEN−Dni || IDDni || IDEN || RTSDni ) where RTSDni is registration
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timestamp generated for Dni and KEN−Dni is the shared secret key between IoT device Dni and the
edge node EN generated by the TA. TA also generates a unique temporary identity TIDDni for Dni
that is different from the previously deployed IoT devices.
DD2. The TA stores the credentials {RIDDni , TIDDni , TCDni , ADni, h(·)} in the memory of Dni
before its placement in the deployment area. Furthermore, the TA securely sends the information
{RIDDni , TIDDni , TCDni , ADni} related to Dni to EN so that the EN can update these information in
its database corresponding to the newly added IoT device Dni. Note that for secure communication
between TA and EN, a pre-shared symmetric key among them is essential, and it is generated by the
TA prior to the placement of the EN.
4.3.2. Dynamic Cloud Server Addition
The upcoming procedure is required to add a new cloud server, say CSnj, in the required part of
the IoT environment.
DC1. The TA chooses a distinct unique identity IDCSnj for CSnj and computes its pseudo identity
as RIDCSnj = h(n ||IDCSnj) and ACSnj = h(KEN−CSnj ||IDCSnj ||IDEN ||RTSCSnj) where RTSCSnj is the
registration timestamp for CSnj. Moreover, KEN−CSnj is the shared secret key of the edge node EN and
cloud server CSnj generated by the TA.
DC2. The TA then stores the credentials {RIDCSnj , ACSnj, IDCSnj , h(·)} into the database of CSnj
prior to its deployment in the IoT environment.
5. Security Analysis of LDAKM-EIoT
In this section, we provide the security analysis of LDAKM-EIoT in Propositions 1–7, which prove
its robustness against the following possible attacks.
Proposition 1. LDAKM-EIoT is resilient against replay attack.
Proof. In LDAKM-EIoT, we utilized various current timestamp values for the communicating entities
(Di, EN, and CSj). In the each exchanged message of LDAKM-EIoT, we used the maximum
transmission delay ∆ T factor, which is a small value. Consequently, an adversary A can not gain any
advantage in replaying the old transmitted messages, which are used in the authentication and key
management procedure among Di, EN, and CSj within ∆ T. Thus, LDAKM-EIoT is secure against
replay attack.
Proposition 2. LDAKM-EIoT is resilient against man-in-the-middle attack (MITM).
Proof. Suppose an adversary A seizes an authentication request message {TIDDi , M1, M2, T1}
exchanged between Di and EN and further tries to update this message in such a way that it looks






1} by using the parameters such
as Ma1 = ADi ⊕ radi and M
a
2 = h(ADi||Ta1 || TIDaDi ||RIDDi || TCDi ||rdi ). The values of the used
variables are RIDDi = h(n||IDDi ), TCDi = h(RIDDi ||IDEN ||IDTA||n||RTSDi ), ADi = h(KEN−Di ||
IDDi ||IDEN || RTSDi ) where RTSDi is the registration timestamp for Di and KEN−Di is the shared
secret key of IoT device and edge node generated by the TA. To launch this attack, A can initiate
the generation of random nonce radi and current timestamp T
a
1 . However, without obtaining the
information about “long term secret” RIDDi , IDEN , IDTA, n, and KEN−Di , A cannot re-create another






1}. By using a similar approach, we can also
explain that other messages cannot be recomputed by A, which are used in the “authentication and
key management” phase without the “long term secrets” used by Di, EN, and CSj. This proves the
resilience of LDAKM-EIoT against MITM.
Proposition 3. LDAKM-EIoT provides protection against different impersonation attacks.
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Proof. Suppose an adversary A attempts to create a valid authentication request message on
behalf of a communicating party (for example, Di) after obtaining Di’s authentication request
Msg1 = {TIDDi , M1, M2, T1} sent towards the EN by Di, where M1 = ADi⊕ rdi and M2 = h(ADi||T1||
TIDDi ||RIDDi || TCDi ||rdi ). The values of the used variables are RIDDi = h(n||IDDi ), TCDi =
h(RIDDi ||IDEN ||IDTA||n||RTSDi ), and ADi = h(KEN−Di || IDDi ||IDEN || RTSDi ) where RTSDi is the
registration timestamp for Di and KEN−Di is the shared secret key of IoT device and edge node
generated by the TA. Note that Msg1 uses M1 and M2, which are computed using the “long term
secrets”(RIDDi , IDEN , IDTA, n, KEN−Di ) and also the “short term secrets” (random nonce rdi ). Without
knowing these secret values, A is not able to create a valid authentication request message on behalf
of the genuine IoT device Di. Hence, we can say that LDAKM-EIoT is resilient against IoT device
impersonation attack. In the same way, it can also be proven that LDAKM-EIoT provides protection
against edge node and cloud server impersonation attacks as the creation of other messages Msg2,
Msg3, and Msg4 employs both “long term” and “short term” secrets. Therefore, LDAKM-EIoT is
secure against impersonation attacks.
Proposition 4. LDAKM-EIoT protects Ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack.
Proof. In LDAKM-EIoT, the session key is computed by a genuine cloud server CSj and the accessed
Di during the the authentication and key management phase as SKCSj−Di = h(TIDDi || T3|| h(ren1
||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) ||h(rCSj ||ACSj ||IDCSj ||T3)). Here, ADi = h(KEN−Di || IDDi ||IDEN ||
RTSDi ) where KEN−Di is the shared secret key of the IoT device and edge node generated by the
TA and KEN−CSi is the shared secret key of the EN and cloud server generated by the TA. Further,
the identities of the IoT device, IDDi , the identity of the edge node IDEN , and the identity of the cloud
server IDCSj are also utilized. It is understandable that the “session key” is the combination of both
the session temporary (ephemeral) information, also called “short term secrets” (different random
nonces and timestamps), as well as the “long term secrets” (different secret keys and identities). Thus,
the session key can only be disclosed if A compromises both the session temporary and long term
secrets. Moreover, as different random nonces and timestamps are used in the computation of the
session keys between Di and CSj in distinct sessions, even if a session key is disclosed for a specific
session, it will not result in computing the session keys of other sessions because of the combination
of short and long term secrets. Thus, LDAKM-EIoT provides protection against session temporary
information attack, and it also preserves the “perfect forward secrecy” goal. Therefore, LDAKM-EIoT
is resilient against “ESL attack”. Consequently, LDAKM-EIoT preserves the session key security under
the “CK adversary model” [40].
Proposition 5. LDAKM-EIoT is resilient against privileged-insider attack.
Proof. The privileged-insider user of a cloud server, say A, knows the registration information
{RIDCSj , ACSj, IDCSj , h(·)}. However, he/she cannot calculate the “session key” on behalf of the cloud
server as the session key utilizes the credentials that are only known to the IoT devices or the edge
node. The “session key” calculated by the legitimate cloud server is SKCSj−Di = h(TIDDi || T3|| h(ren1
||T1 ||ADi ||IDDi ||rdi ||TCDi ) ||h(rCSj ||ACSj ||IDCSj ||T3)). Moreover, ren1 is the random nonce of the
EN. The identities of the IoT device, IDDi , the identity of the edge node IDEN , and identity of the
cloud server IDCSj are also utilized in SKCSj−Di . The privileged-insider user of the cloud server does
not have any information about IDDi , IDEN , and KEN−Di . Therefore, A cannot calculate the “session
key” on behalf of the cloud server, as well as he/she cannot impersonate the cloud server, as explained
in Proposition 3. Hence, LDAKM-EIoT is resilient against “privileged-insider attack”.
Proposition 6. LDAKM-EIoT preserves the anonymity and untraceability properties.
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Proof. Let us assume an adversary A intercepts the messages Msg1 = {TIDDi , M1, M2, T1}, Msg2
= {TID′Di , M3, M4, T2}, Msg3 = {M5, M6, M7, T3}, and Msg4 = {M8, α, β, M9, M10, T3, T4} during
the “authentication and key management phase” between Di and CSj via the EN. We used random
nonces and current timestamps in the construction of messages, which helped to generate dynamic
and unique messages for different sessions. Moreover, the identities IDDi , IDEN , and IDCSj are not
transmitted in the plaintext format during transmission. This helps to attain both the anonymity and
untraceability objectives of LDAKM-EIoT.
Proposition 7. LDAKM-EIoT provides protection against IoT device physical capture attack.
Proof. Each IoT device stores the credentials {RIDDi , TIDDi , TCDi , ADi, h(·)}, which are used for
the “authentication and key management” purposes with other network communicating entities.
The protection against IoT device physical capture attack is a very essential security requirement [50,51].
Suppose nc IoT devices are physically captured by an adversary A. We assess the IoT device physical
capture attack as the fraction of total secure communications that are compromised from the capturing
of nc IoT devices not including the communication in which the “compromised IoT devices” are
straightforwardly extended. For example, one can estimate the probability of A’s ability to decrypt the
secure communication between a cloud server CSj and a non-compromised IoT device Di when nc IoT
devices are already physically stolen and compromised. Suppose this probability is represented by
Pe(nc). If Pe(nc) = 0, an “authentication and key management” protocol is termed as “unconditionally
secure against IoT device physical capture attack”. From a captured IoT device Di, A will have
the extracted credentials {RIDDi , TIDDi , TCDi , ADi, h(·)} along with the secret pairwise session key
SKCSj−Di shared between Di and CSj from its memory. However, it is very important to notice that
all RIDDi , TIDDi , TCDi , ADi, RTSDi , and KEN−Di are distinct for all installed IoT devices. Thus,
the stolen Di by A can only help to find the secret keys between that Di and CSj. Furthermore,
this results in all other secret keys between that CSj and other non-compromised IoT devices Di to
be not still revealed. Therefore, compromising an IoT device will not cause the compromise of the
entire communication, and we get the secure communications among the cloud server and other
non-compromised IoT devices. This means that LDAKM-EIoT is unconditionally secure against IoT
device physical capture attack.
6. Formal Security Verification Using AVISPA
This section shows the resilience of the proposed scheme (LDAKM-EIoT) against replay and
man-in-the-middle attacks based on the formal security verification. We applied the broadly-accepted
“Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)” tool [52] to achieve
this goal. There are four backends, namely “on-the-fly mode-checker (OFMC)”, “constraint-logic based
attack searcher (CL-AtSe)”, “SAT (Boolean satisfiability problem) based model checker (SATMC)”, and
“tree automata based on automatic approximations for the analysis of security protocols (TA4SP)”, which
are integrated with the AVISPA tool. These backends help in automatic execution analysis of the security
protocols. The “High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL)” helps in converting the high level
implementation of the the security protocols into the “Intermediate Format (IF)” using the HLPSl2IF
translator. HLPSL defines the roles for all the involved participating entities in a protocol, which are
termed as the basic roles. The compulsory roles, known as “session” and “goal and environment”,
consist of the composition of the sessions along with globally defined constants, respectively. The IF is
provided as input to one of the four backends to produce the “Output Format (OF)”, which explicitly
explains under what conditions the protocol becomes “safe”, “unsafe”, or “inconclusive”. The precise
discussion on AVISPA and its HLPSL is available in [52]. The AVISPA tool is one of the widely used
formal security verification tools. Researchers working in the authentication domain frequently use this
software tool to validate the security of authentication protocols [1–3,46,48,53].
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In our implementation of the proposed scheme (LDAKM-EIoT) under HLPSL, we defined four
basic roles: (a) the role for the TA, (b) the role for an IoT device Di, (c) the role for the edge node
EN, and (d) the role for a cloud server CSj. Apart from these basic roles, we had two compulsory
roles (“session” and “goal and environment”). We applied the “SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator
for AVISPA)” [54] for simulating LDAKM-EIoT. The backends that we covered were OFMC and
CL-AtSe, because they support the bitwise XOR operation. Therefore, we excluded the simulation
results under other backends (i.e., SATMC and TA4SP) from the simulation part, because they did
not currently support XOR operation, and the results would be under these backends “inconclusive”.
Figure 4 shows the simulation results under the OFMC and CL-AtSe backends. The summary of these
backends helped us to predict the security of a designed scheme against replay and man-in-the-middle
attacks. Under the OFMC backend, the simulation took 1019 milliseconds, while traversing 129
visited nodes at a depth of 20 plies. On the other hand, under the CL-Atse backend, 256 states were
analyzed, and out of those states, 124 states were reachable with 0.58 s of translation time and 0.05 s of
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Figure 4. Analysis of simulation results under the CL-AtSe and OFMC backends.
7. Comparative Analysis with Existing Schemes
In this section, the comparative study of LDAKM-EIoT with other related existing schemes, such as
the schemes designed by Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41],
and Turkanovic et al. [18], is done. It is worth noting that the schemes of Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21],
Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41], and Turkanovic et al. [18] were designed for the IoT environment.
7.1. Comparative Study of Communication Costs
We took the identity, random nonce, hash digest (if the secure hash algorithm (SHA-1) [55] was
utilized), and timestamp as 160, 128, 160, and 32 bits, respectively. It well known that the 1024 bit
“RSA public key cryptosystem” maintains the same security level as that for the 160 bit “elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) cryptosystem” [56]. Thus, an elliptic curve point of the form P = (Px, Py) took
(160 + 160) = 320 bits. The communication costs of LDAKM-EIoT and other schemes are provided
in Table 2. In LDAKM-EIoT, the messages Msg1 = {TIDDi , M1, M2, T1}, Msg2 = {TID′Di , M3,
M4, T2}, Msg3 = {M5, M6, M7, T3}, and Msg4 = {M8, α, β, M9, M10, T3, T4} incurred the costs of
(160+ 160+ 160+ 32) = 512 bits, (160+ 160+ 160+ 32) = 512 bits, (160 + 160 + 160 + 32) = 512 bits,
and (160 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 32 + 32) = 864 bits, respectively, and hence, all the messages
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needed a total of (512 + 512 + 512 + 864) = 2400 bits. On the other side, the communication costs
for the schemes of Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41], and
Turkanovic et al. [18] were 2528, 2752, 2912, 3840, and 2720 bits, respectively. It is depicted in Table 2
that LDAKM-EIoT performed better in terms of communication cost as compared to other considered
existing schemes of Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41], and
Turkanovic et al. [18].
Table 2. Communication costs’ comparison. LDAKM-EIoT, the lightweight authentication and key
management scheme for the edge based IoT environment.
Protocol No. of Messages No. of Bits
LDAKM-EIoT 4 2400
Challa et al. [3] 3 2528
Farash et al. [21] 4 2752
Sharma and Kalra [39] 4 2912
Zhou et al. [41] 4 3840
Turkanovic et al. [18] 4 2720
7.2. Comparative Study of Computation Costs
The notations Tecm, Tf e, and Th are used to represent the time required for an “ECC point
multiplication”, a “fuzzy extractor function” for biometric verification in the case of the scheme
designed by Challa et al. [3], and a “one way hash function”, respectively. Based on the experimental
results available in [57], we took Th ≈ 0.00032 s, Tecm ≈ 0.0171 s, and Tf e ≈ Tecm, that is Tf e ≈ 0.0171 s.
The computation costs’ comparison among LDAKM-EIoT and other schemes is depicted in Table 3.
In LDAKM-EIoT, during the authentication and key agreement procedure, Di, EN, and CSj incurred
9Th ≈ 2.88 ms, 15Th ≈ 4.8 ms, and 8Th ≈ 2.56 ms, respectively. The comparative results demonstrated
that LDAKM-EIoT performed better than Challa et al.’s scheme [3] and Zhou et al.’s scheme [41].
Moreover, LDAKM-EIoT needed the same computation cost as compared to that for Farash et al.’s
scheme [21]. However, LDAKM-EIoT required more computation cost as compared to that for
Sharma and Kalra’s scheme [39] and Turkanovic et al.’s scheme [18]. However, this was accepted
as LDAKM-EIoT provided extra security and functionality features as compared to those for the
other compared schemes of Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41],
and Turkanovic et al. [18] (see Table 4).
Table 3. Comparison of computation costs.
Scheme User/Smart Gateway Node/ Sensing Device Total CostIoT Device Edge Node /Cloud Server
LDAKM-EIoT 9Th 15Th 8Th 32Th≈ 2.88 ms ≈ 4.8 ms ≈ 2.56 ms ≈ 10.24 ms
Challa et al. [3] 1Tf e + 5Tecm+ 5Th 5Tecm + 4Th 4Tecm + 3Th 1Tf e + 14Tecm+ 12Th≈ 104.20 ms ≈ 86.78ms ≈ 69.36 ms ≈ 260.34 ms
Farash et al. [21] 11Th 14Th 7Th 32Th≈ 3.52 ms ≈ 4.48 ms ≈ 2.24 ms ≈ 10.24 ms
Sharma and Kalra [39] 11Th 7Th 5Th 23Th≈ 3.52 ms ≈ 2.24 ms ≈ 1.6 ms ≈ 7.36 ms
Zhou et al. [41] 10Th 7Th 19Th 36Th≈ 3.2 ms ≈ 2.24 ms ≈ 6.08 ms ≈ 11.52 ms
Turkanovic et al. [18] 7Th 5Th 7Th 19Th≈ 2.24 ms ≈ 1.6 ms ≈ 2.24 ms ≈ 6.08 ms
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Table 4. Comparison of functionality and security features.
Feature Farash Challa Turkanovic Sharma and Zhou LDAKM-EIoTet al. [21] et al. [3] et al. [18] Kalra [39] et al. [41]
FSF1 × X X × X X
FSF2 × X × × × X
FSF3 × X × × X X
FSF4 × X × × X NA
FSF5 X X X X X X
FSF6 × X × X × NA
FSF7 X X X X × X
FSF8 X X X X × X
FSF9 X X X X × X
FSF10 X X X X X X
FSF11 X × × X X X
FSF12 X X X X NA X
FSF13 X X X X × NA
FSF14 X × X X NA X
FSF15 NA X × × × NA
FSF16 X X × X X X
FSF17 × X × × × NA
FSF18 × X X × × X
Note: FSF1: the property to make the user or smart IoT device anonymous; FSF2: protection for
privileged-insider attack; FSF3: protection for off-line password guessing attack; FSF4: protection for stolen
smart card or mobile device attack; FSF5: protection for denial-of-service attack; FSF6: protection for user
impersonation attack; FSF7: protection for replay attack; FSF8: protection for man-in-the middle attack;
FSF9: achieves mutual authentication; FSF10: achieves session key agreement; FSF11: property to make
messages untraceability; FSF12: protection for sensor node/sensor/smart IoT device physical capture attack;
FSF13: presence of server independent password update phase; FSF14: protection for sensor node/sensing
device/smart IoT device impersonation attack; FSF15: support biometric update phase; FSF16: provide
formal security verification using the automated software verification tool; FSF17: presence of the smart card
revocation phase; FSF18: protection for session-key security under the CK adversary model. ×: insecure
against a “specific attack” or a “particular feature” is not there; X: secure against a “specific attack” or
a “particular feature” is present; NA: not applicable.
7.3. Comparative Study of Security and Functionality Attributes
The comparison of the security and functionality attributes for the proposed LDAKM-EIoT and
other related schemes is shown in Table 4. Various features (FSF1-FSF4, FSF6, FSF17, and FSF18) were
not supported/available in the scheme of Farash et al. [21], whereas Challa et al.’s scheme [3] did not
support the features FSF11 and FSF14, which were shown by Jia et al. [37]. Moreover, other schemes,
such as the schemes of Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41], and Turkanovic et al. [18] did not
provide the required functionality and security features. On the other hand, LDAKM-EIoT provided
better security and functionality features as compared to other related schemes.
8. NS2 Simulation Study
In this section, we conduct the simulation study on LDAKM-EIoT and other existing related schemes
of Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41], and Turkanovic et al. [18]
using the NS2 simulator. The impact of LDAKM-EIoT and other related schemes is studied and compared
on important network performance parameters (for example, throughput (available in bits per second
(bps)) and end-to-end delay (available in seconds)).
8.1. Simulation Parameters
The specifics of the network parameters used in the NS2 simulation are given in Table 5.
The simulation time was 30 min (1800 s). Sj and CSj respectively represent the jth sensor node and
cloud server, whereas Ui/Di represents the ith user/IoT smart device respectively in LDAKM-EIoT and
other schemes [3,21]. Moreover, we took one gateway node (GW)/edge node (EN) in all the compared
schemes. The communication range of smart device or sensor was taken as 100 m. The messages
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exchanged among different communicating entities along with their communication costs (in bits)
for different schemes are depicted in Table 6, which were used in the simulation for exchanging the
packets (messages) among the entities. We applied the ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [58]
as the routing protocol. All other parameters used in the simulation were taken as standard ones.
Table 5. Different parameters used in the simulation. AODV, ad hoc on-demand distance vector.
Parameter Description
Platform Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
Tool used NS2 2.35
Number of gateway nodes/edge nodes 1(whenever applicable)
Number of users or IoT device 9(whenever applicable)
Number of sensors or cloud server 10(whenever applicable)
Simulation time 1800 s
Communication range of sensors/IoT devices 100 m
Routing protocol AODV [58]
Table 6. Different messages exchanged among entities used in the simulation.
Exchanged Messages Challa Farash Turkanovic Sharma Zhou LDAKM-EIoTbetween Network Entities et al. [3] et al. [21] et al. [18] and Kalra [39] et al. [41]
Ui/Di → GW/EN 992 bits 512 bits 672 bits 672 bits 800 bits 512 bits
GW/EN → SDj/Sj/CSj 1024 bits 1024 bits 1024 bits 1024 bits 1600 bits 512 bits
SDj/Sj/CSj → GW/EN − 672 bits 576 bits 672 bits 960 bits 512 bits
GW/EN → Ui/Di − 544 bits 448 bits 544 bits 480 bits 864 bits
SDj/Sj/CSj → Ui/Di 512 bits − − − − −
8.2. Comparative Analysis of the Simulation Results
The comparative analysis of the network performance parameters for LDAKM-EIoT, Challa et al. [3],
and Farash et al. [21] is discussed in the following.
8.2.1. Comparative Analysis of the Network Throughput
The network throughput can be calculated as “the number of bits transmitted per unit time,
and it can be mathematically expressed as (νr × |ρ|)/Td, where Td is the total time (in seconds), |ρ|
the size of a packet, and νr the total number of received packets”. The simulation time was 1800 s,
which was the actual total considered time. In Figure 5a, the throughput values for the schemes of
Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Turkanovic et al. [18], Sharma and Kalra [39], Zhou et al. [41],
and the proposed LDAKM-EIoT are 173.49 bps, 164.34 bps, 160.41 bps, 169.85 bps, 217.16 bps,
and 148.95 bps, respectively. It was observed that the throughput of LDAKM-EIoT was less than the
other schemes [3,18,21,39,41]. This was primarily due to the reason that LDAKM-EIoT applied the
small sized messages, which caused less communication overhead for the authentication procedure as
compared to the other schemes (see Table 6).





















































Figure 5. Comparison of network parameters: (a) network throughput; (b) end-to-end delay.
8.2.2. Comparative Analysis of the End-to-End Delay
The end-to-end delay (EED) is measured as “the average time taken by the data packets to arrive
at a receiving node from a sender node, and it is mathematically expressed in the form ∑
νp
i=1(Treci −
Tsendi)/νp, where Treci and Tsendi are the receiving and sending time of a packet i, respectively, and νp the
total number of packets”. From the simulation results provided in Figure 5b, it was observed that EED
values for the schemes of Challa et al. [3], Farash et al. [21], Turkanovic et al. [18], Sharma and Kalra [39],
Zhou et al. [41], and LDAKM-EIoT were 0.17230 s, 0.15151 s, 0.12478 s, 0.12496 s, 0.13707 s, and 0.11640 s,
respectively. The EED value of LDAKM-EIoT was less than the schemes provided in [3,18,21,39,41].
This was again due to the reason that LDAKM-EIoT applied small sized messages for the authentication
procedure, which caused less end-to-end delay as compared to other schemes.
9. Conclusions
The edge based IoT environment suffers from serious security and privacy issues. It was observed
that the majority of the existing schemes for authentication and key management have limitations as
they were vulnerable to various attacks. Some of them were not even efficient from the computation
and communication cost point of view. Consequently, a new authentication and key management
scheme with lightweight cryptographic operations was designed for the edge based IoT environment
(LDAKM-EIoT). The rigorous security analysis of LDAKM-EIoT using formal security verification using
AVISPA tool and also other security analysis evidenced that LDAKM-EIoT could prevent different
possible well known attacks. LDAKM-EIoT also supported new smart IoT device deployment in
the network after the initial deployment. Moreover, LDAKM-EIoT preserved the anonymity and
untraceability properties. LDAKM-EIoT was also compared with the closely related existing schemes in
the IoT environment. The conducted comparative performance analysis and NS2 based simulation study
on the network performance parameters evidenced that LDAKM-EIoT was much better in security and
functionality features, communication, and computation as compared to other existing schemes.
In the future, we would like to implement the proposed LDAKM-EIoT in a testbed environment.
Moreover, we would also like to include more functionality features in the proposed LDAKM-EIoT
while maintaining less communication and computational overheads without degrading the security.
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